The Protection of Human Rights by the Judiciary and Other Structures in South Africa by Langa, Pius Nkonzo
SMU Law Review
Volume 52 | Issue 4 Article 3
1999
The Protection of Human Rights by the Judiciary
and Other Structures in South Africa
Pius Nkonzo Langa
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pius Nkonzo Langa, The Protection of Human Rights by the Judiciary and Other Structures in South Africa, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1531 (1999)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol52/iss4/3
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY




ISTINGUISHED guests, ladies and gentlemen, my topic deals
with the protection of human rights in South Africa by the judi-
ciary as well as the other structures that have been established
under the new Constitution. I will deal with this in a number of segments
and will not go into too much detail. The story of South Africa's trials
and tribulations, up to the post apartheid dispensation, is sufficiently well
known. It should suffice, for today's purposes, to provide a broad outline
and discuss a few salient points.
The starting point will be the nature of the South African state, because
that provides the setting, the background, against which the judiciary and
the other institutions function. I shall then deal with some of the changes
which have come about as a result of the adoption of the new constitu-
tional order: new institutions which support democracy and their role in
the protection, promotion, and advancing of human rights; the courts in
general; and the Constitutional Court in particular. Finally, I shall deal
with some of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and in that
context say a word or two about the all important social and economic
rights and our experience with regard to their implementation.
II. THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE
South Africa is now a democracy. For those who have never exper-
ienced other forms of governance, the impact, the significance, of this
simple statement might be hard to appreciate. But we have been through
fifty years of an oppressive system under apartheid, one of the basic fea-
tures of which was the disenfranchisement and the disempowerment of
the great majority of our population. For South Africans, therefore, and I
think for mankind generally, the transformation of the South African
state into a democracy is cause for celebration. It not only signalled a
resounding rejection of a past which was characterized by gross human
rights violations, perpetrated by the government and its multifarious
* Deputy President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Justice Langa de-
livered this paper as part of the Alfred P. Murrah lecture series at Southern Methodist
University School of Law, Dallas, Texas, on October 22, 1998.
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agencies and institutions, it provided a new setting and an enabling cli-
mate for the recognition, protection and advancement of human rights.
Before 1994, precisely because of the undemocratic system of govern-
ment, the climate was hostile to the notion that human rights should be
recognized and protected. The main preoccupation of government was
the maintenance of political power, exercised by a white minority and
based on race, discrimination, and oppression. What was designed was
almost limitless power. Thanks to the doctrine of parliamentary sover-
eignty that had been adopted, what that unrepresentative parliament de-
creed could not be challenged before the courts. The judiciary did not
have the option to review and reverse unjust laws, rather the courts and
all the other institutions had to implement and administer them. In the
nature of things, because that power had not been consented to or man-
dated by the great majority of the people over which it was exercised,
rule had to be by force; thus draconian laws and measures were un-
leashed on the people. There were forced removals of whole communi-
ties; detention without trial; solitary confinement; security measures and
practices which made people disappear; and many were killed in police
custody. There were measures which rendered the security forces, that is
the police and the army, largely unaccountable and therefore able to
commit the sort of atrocities which we now hear of in the Truth and Rec-
onciliation process.
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was abused by the enact-
ment of laws that violated rights that were taken for granted elsewhere in
the civilized world. The courts and other structures that were in existence
then were simply powerless to check this abuse and these violations. But,
of course, that period had to end.
III. THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The new order was officially installed in 1994 with the adoption of a
new Constitution. Gone was parliamentary supremacy; the Constitution,
with an entrenched Bill of Rights, became supreme. Any "law or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid" and liable to be struck down.' The new
order is a constitutional democracy. The universal franchise that is a fea-
ture of it meant the conferment of political power on every citizen. New
structures and new provisions were put in place to ensure that the guar-
anteed rights are indeed accessible to every person and to ensure that
governance is open and accountable and is carried out in accordance with
the new value system. For South Africans, therefore, it is a complete
break with the past. The Bill of Rights, enshrining all the fundamental
rights which had been violated in the past, became a central feature of the
new order. The new era of constitutionalism requires that governance
should be open and accountable.
1. S. AFR. CONST., ch. 1, § 2.
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IV. NEW STRUCTURES SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY
A number of new structures were established by the Constitution to
strengthen democracy. We refer to them as Chapter 9 structures or insti-
tutions, because they appear, and their functions and powers are set out,
in that chapter of the new Constitution. They are "independent and sub-
ject only to the Constitution and the law," and are required to be impar-
tial and to "perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice."' 2
The Constitution further requires of other organs of state to "assist and
protect these institutions to ensure their independence, impartiality, dig-
nity and effectiveness."'3
The institutions are:
(1) the Public Protector, whose function is to investigate any conduct
in state affairs or in public administration in any sphere and to report on
such conduct. The Public Protector must be accessible to the public to
take their complaints;4
(2) the Human Rights Commission, whose duty it is to promote re-
spect for human rights and to monitor and assess observance of human
rights; 5
(3) the Commission for Gender Equality, which aims to promote and
protect gender equality and combats unfair discrimination based on gen-
der;6 and
(4) the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities,7 the Auditor-General 8
and the Electoral Commission.9
V. THE COURTS
Apart from the structures referred to, we have the courts.' 0 Before
1994, South Africa had one court structure. There was one Supreme
Court of South Africa, comprised of a number of provincial and local
divisions and which had as its apex the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa (the AD), which was the final court of
appeal. The seat of the AD was in Bloemfontein. The provincial divi-
sions, apart from being courts of first instance in serious cases, also exer-
cised appellate jurisdiction in matters from district magistrates and
regional courts. This hierarchy did not change with the coming into force
of the interim Constitution in 1994. The nomenclature, however, changed
with the coming into force of the new Constitution in 1996. The respec-
2. Id. ch. 9, § 181(2).
3. Id. § 181(3).
4. Id. § 182.
5. Id. § 184.
6. See S. AFR. CONST., ch. 9, § 187.
7. See id. § 185.
8. See id. § 188.
9. See id. § 190.
10. See id. ch. 8, §§ 166-173.
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tive provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court became High
Courts, and the AD became the Supreme Court of Appeal." The pres-
ent position is that magistrates' courts "may not enquire into or rule on
the constitutionality of any legislation or any conduct of the President." 12
High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal have constitutional juris-
diction, but the Constitutional Court must confirm any order of invalidity
made by these courts before that order can have any force.' 3
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
With the coming into force of the interim Constitution, a new court,
with a new jurisdiction, was established. Apart from being the highest
court in all constitutional matters,1 4 the Constitutional Court stands as a
strong symbol of the country's drastic break from the past. Just as the
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany was created in
the aftermath of the sad experiences under Nazi Germany after the Sec-
ond World War, our Constitutional Court is meant to safeguard this new
Constitution and its Bill of Rights. Its jurisdiction is confined to constitu-
tional matters only, "and issues connected with decisions on constitu-
tional matters; and ... [the court] makes the final decision whether a
matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is connected with a
decision on a constitutional matter."15
VII. COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Constitutional Court is composed of eleven judges who serve for a
non-renewable term of twelve years or the age 70, whichever comes
first.16 There is a constitutional requirement that the justices must hear
each case together and that the composition of the Court should be
broadly representative of the South African population in race and gen-
der.17 The appointment procedure of the judges of the Court was a novel
one. With regard to our history and that of the judiciary in South Africa
during the apartheid years, the appointees to the Constitutional Court
had to meet certain requirements. It was necessary that members of the
Court should be able to engender confidence in the Constitutional Court
and that they should be broadly acceptable to a sceptical public just
emerging from a past of deep divisions, conflict, and gross violations of
human rights. A Judicial Service Commission, itself a new and represen-
tative body, was established to conduct interviews with candidates for ap-
11. See id. ch. 8, §§ 168-169. Section 168(3) of the Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court of Appeal "is the highest court of appeal except in constitutional matters."
S. AFR. CONST., ch. 8, § 168(3).
12. Id. § 170.
13. See id. § 167(5).
14. See id. § 167(3)(a).
15. See id. § 167(3).
16. See id. §§ 167(1), 176(1).
17. See S. AFR. CONST., ch. 8, §§ 167(2), 174(2).
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pointment.18 Eventually what emerged from the process was what, in
South African terms, was a more or less balanced court in terms of race,
gender and life experience. The first appointees to the Court included
sitting Judges of other courts, practicing advocates and law professors.
VIII. THE JURISDICTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The profile of the Constitutional Court depends, in part, on how its
judgments are received. Many in South Africa had seen and experienced
the misuse of the legal system and the court structures by successive
apartheid governments. When the new institution came into being, many
felt that it should be given all the support possible. The Court is held in
very high regard, and we find that where the Court has made a ruling, as
it often does, which has far-reaching public consequences, those decisions
are respected by everyone concerned.
Certain matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitu-
tional Court. Only the Constitutional Court may:
(a) decide disputes between organs of state in the national or pro-
vincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, powers or func-
tions of any of those organs of state;
(b) decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provin-
cial Bill... ;
(c) decide applications by members of the National Assembly or of
a provincial legislature for an order declaring all or part of an Act to
be unconstitutional;
(d) decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the
Constitution;
(e) decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a con-
stitutional obligation; or
(f) certify a provincial constitution .... 19
Apart from the exclusive jurisdiction referred to above, the Court is
also the court of final instance in all constitutional matters. We have
dealt with a variety of matters in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The
right to a fair trial20 has accounted for a substantial number of cases
before the Court. These come to the Court in a number of ways. We
have dealt with reverse onus provisions and made the point that, as in all
modem democratic countries, it is for the state to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and not for the accused to prove his/
her innocence.21 In the so-called death penalty case,22 perhaps the best
publicized, we dealt with the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman
and degrading punishment or treatment, the right to life and the right to
18. See id. § 178.
19. Id. § 167(4); see id. ch. 4, § 122.
20. See id. ch. 2, § 35(3).
21. See e.g., S v. Bhulwana; S v. Gwadiso 1996 (1) SALR 388 (CC), 1995(12) BCLR
1579 (SA); Scagell and Others v. Attorney-General, Western Cape and Others 1997(2) SA
368 (CC), 1996(11) BCLR 1446 (SA).
22. See e.g., S v. Makwanyane and Another 1995(3) SA 391 (SA); 1995(6) BCLR 665(SA).
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dignity. But there have been other cases involving a variety of laws, such
as provisions dealing with pornography, free speech and so-on.23 We
have dealt with the right to legal representation,2 4 and there have been
interesting cases based on equality issues.25 There were provisions involv-
ing gender discrimination, which, for example, placed a cap on what a
widow could get by way of insurance payouts while the position with re-
gard to a bereaved male spouse was not affected; provisions which af-
fected claims for loss of support depending on the marriage regime the
parties have entered into.26 There have been claims based on gender or
race discrimination by men as well.27 Examples are numerous. All the
cases proved to be interesting and difficult, and we have had to make
difficult rulings. The Court has not been spared of its duty to make ex-
cruciatingly difficult and unpleasant decisions. The area of socio-eco-
nomic rights is a case in point. There was the case of the hospital patient
with very severe kidney failure, who required treatment with a dialysis
machine to prolong his life, with no hope of recovery.28 Hospital and
state resources could only provide for patients who could recover. The
Court, weighing the interest of the dying person against the wider inter-
ests of the community, was unable to come to Mr. Soobramoney's assist-
ance because of the problem of scarce resources.2 9 The debate and
controversy that followed the Court's decision challenged ordinary peo-
ple to look again at the practical problems concerning constitutionally-
guaranteed socio-economic rights against the background of scarce
resources.
In its role as the guardian of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
Court has been required to perform other constitutional functions, apart
from resolving conventional constitutional disputes. The certification ex-
ercise is perhaps the best example of these, when the Court had to ex-
amine the text of the new Constitution minutely to determine whether or
not it was consistent with the thirty-four principles which had been
23. See e.g., Case and Another v. Minister of Safety of Security and Others; Curtis v
Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996(3) SALR 617(CC), 1996(5) BCLR 609
(SA); JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another v. Minister of Safety and Security and Others
1997(3) SALR 514 (CC); 1996(12) BCLR 1599 (SA).
24. See S v. Vermaas; S v. Du Plessis 1995(3) SALR 292 (CC), 1995(7) BCLR 851
(SA).
25. See e.g., Harksen v. Lane No. and Others 1998(1) SALR 300 (CC); 1997(11)
BCLR 1489 (SA); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minis-
ter of Justice and Others 1999(1) SALR 6 (CC); 1998(12) BCLR 1517 (SA).
26. See Brink v Kitshoff No. 1996(4) SALR 197 (CC), 19996(6) BCLR 752 (SA);
Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998(4) SALR 753 (CC), 1998(10)
BCLR 1207 (SA).
27. See President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v. Hugo 1997(4) SALR
1 (CC), 1997(6) BCLR 708 (SA); Pretoria City Council v. Walker 1998(2) SA 363 (CC);
1998(3) BCLR 257 (CC).
28. See Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998(1) SALR 765 (CC),
1997(12) BCLR 1696 (SA).
29. See id.
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agreed upon.30 The principles covered a wide range of issues, and the
Court had to scrutinize the constitutional text to make sure that it had
complied with each principle. In the event that the Court found that the
text was not strictly in accordance with some of the principles and refused
to certify it, it referred it back to the Constitutional Assembly for correc-
tion. It was only on the second attempt that the Court was able to certify
that the constitutional text, as rectified and resubmitted, complied with
the Constitutional Principles.31 The certification process was a unique ex-
ercise, and, as in many other areas of our jurisprudence, the Court had to
chart its own path without any precedent from anywhere in the world.
As for the Constitutional Principles, they formed an important frame-
work as guidelines on the form and content of the new constitutional text.
For example, one such principle concerned with the Bill of Rights pro-
vided that the new Constitution must contain all universally accepted fun-
damental human rights.32 This not only meant that a Bill of Rights had to
be entrenched in the Constitution, it referred pertinently to the subject
matter, the content, of the individual rights.
Other functions given to the Constitutional Court by the Constitution
include the certification of provincial constitutions to ensure that each
one is not in any way inconsistent with the national Constitution.33 Cer-
tain provisions of the Constitution give the Court a measure of legislative
and executive control. The President or a provincial premier may, before
signing a Bill which has been passed by Parliament or a provincial legisla-
ture as the case may be, refer it to the Constitutional Court if he or she
has reservations about the constitutionality of its provisions.34 Similarly,
members of the national and provincial parliament may apply for the re-
ferral of an Act to the Constitutional Court if they have doubts about the
constitutionality of the Act's provision.35 The Court also has exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to disputes between organs of state at each
level of government.36 A declaration that a law or any of its provisions is
unconstitutional must be confirmed by the Constitutional Court before it
30. See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996(4) SALR 744 (CC), 1996(10)
BCLR 1253 (SA); see also S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act 1993) Schedule 4.
31. See Ex Parte Chairperson of the National Assembly: In re Certification of the
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997(2) SALR 97
(CC), 1997(1) BCLR 1 (SA).
32. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act 1993) Schedule 4, Constitutional Principle
II.
33. See Ex Parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature; In re Certifica-
tion of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996 1996(4) SALR 1098 (CC),
1996(11) BCLR 1419 (SA); Ex Parte Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Legislature; In
re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 1997(4) SALR 795 (CC);
1997(9) BCLR 1167 (SA); Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Legislature; In re Certifi-
cation of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 1998(1) SALR
655 (CC), 1997(12) BCLR 1653 (CC).
34. See S. AFR. CONST., ch. 4, § 79(A); ch. 6, § 121(2).
35. See id., ch. 4, § 80(1); ch. 6, § 121(2).
36. See id., ch. 8, § 167 (4)(a).
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can be of any force.37
IX. CONCLUSION
It should be obvious that although the Constitutional Court has an im-
portant and distinctive role in the development and maintenance of this
emerging democracy, it alone can never achieve this. The biggest re-
source in South Africa and elsewhere is the vigilance of the people and
their commitment to make the democracy work. All the structures re-
quired by the Constitution are presently in place. They are functioning
more or less at optimum capacity. What will be important is their effec-
tiveness in changing the lives of people. The test of our constitutional
dispensation is the accessibility of all these rights and protections to the
people who actually need them. That is why we believe that the people
must take responsibility for the Constitution which has been created by
them.
37. See id. § 172(2).
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